Playing Games with Iran

I came across this when doing some research in game theory. Andreas Blume at the University of Pittsburgh gives an example, through game theory, of what courses of action the US could take with respect to Iran.
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Iran and the West
Iran seeks to go forward with work on uranium enrichment.
The US and Europe are worried that having a uranium enrichment facility will eventually enable Iran to build a nuclear bomb.
A coarse description of their respective strategic options might be as follows:
1. The West can ignore the problem, engage in diplomacy, or act militarily.
2. Iran can give up their nuclear ambition, slowly develop its enrichment capabilities, or opt for rapid development.

Some thoughts about payoffs for the West-Iran Game:

1.We will choose to model the conflict as a zero-sum game. A note of caution: This deliberately ignores that there are numerous dimensions of common interest between Iran and the West.
2. It suffices to keep track of the payoff of only one of players (we’ll choose the West); the other player’s payoffs are the same, except with the opposite sign.
3. If Iran decides to give up its nuclear ambition, then ignoring what they do is a valid option for the West, which will be indicated by a positive payoff, 5, for the West. Recall that Iran’s payoff in this case must be −5.
4. Ignoring Iran’s ambitions is less attractive if Iran chooses slow, indicated by a negative payoff, -2, for the West.
5. The worst outcome for the West is to ignore the problem when Iran proceeds rapidly, indicated by a payoff of -6.
6. The best outcome for the West with diplomacy would be if Iran gave up its ambition. The worst outcome in this case would be if Iran kept slowly developing its enrichment capabilities. In the case that Iran proceeded
rapidly, it would then be possible to convince others, e.g. Russia and China, that diplomacy has been exhausted.
7. Military action, in the game we will set up, is the preferred option only in the event that Iran proceeds rapidly.

Payoff Matrix for West-Iran Game

Iran
Give Up __Slow __Rapid

_____________________________Ignore______ 5__ _-2____-6
__________________West __ Diplomacy _____4 ____-1 ____1
_______________________________Act _____-5 ____-4 ____2

Game III-2

Consider the West’s decision problem first:

Unlike before, assume that the West is afraid that Iran will always discover its strategy choice and that, knowing the West’s strategy, Iran will always try to hold the West’s payoff as low as possible.

One may ask: What is the best strategy against an omniscient opponent who is trying to minimize one’s payoff?

1. Against an omniscient adversary with diametrically opposed interests, the West’s payoff from ignore is -6.
2. Against an omniscient adversary with diametrically opposed interests, the West’s payoff from diplomacy is -1.
3. Against an omniscient adversary with diametrically opposed interests, the West’s payoff from act is -5.

4. In this scenario there is an unambiguously best strategy for the West: Diplomacy.

Observe that the payoff of −1 is the highest payoff that the West can guarantee for itself in this game.

The West secures at least the payoff -1 by adopting the strategy diplomacy.

Assume that Iran is equally afraid that the West will have advance knowledge of Iran’s strategy and will limit Iran’s payoff as much as possible.

We can think of Iran as trying to minimize the West’s payoff. Thus, in our payoff matrix, Iran aims for low values.

One may ask: What is the best strategy for Iran against an omniscient West who is trying to limit Iran’s payoff as much as possible?

In this world, Iran will try to minimize the maximum payoff that the West can achieve against any of Iran’s strategies.

-The West’s highest payoff against Iran’s strategy give up is 5.

-The West’s highest payoff against Iran’s strategy slow is -1.

-The West’s highest payoff against Iran’s strategy rapid is 2.

Recall our assumption that Iran’s goal is to minimize the maximum payoff the West can achieve against Iran’s strategy.

This goal is achieved by adopting the strategy slow.

Iran’s strategy slow guarantees that the West can achieve no higher payoff than -1.

Observe that both the West and Iran can guarantee the payoff -1 in this game.

The West can guarantee that its payoff will be at least -1.

Iran can guarantee that the West’s payoff is no higher than -1.

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It appears as though Diplomacy is the best course of action.

Source: http://www.pitt.edu/~ablume/Game%20Theory%20Principles/game-slides-3.pdf

Iranian Media

Here is an 9 min compilation of Iranian media clips pulled together by MEMRI.

We Are the Knights Who Say NIE!

Sorry, I couldn't resist. I'd thought some Monty Python would lighten the mood. Speaking of the British, here is some more analysis of the NIE report, this time coming from the BBC:

Indeed, the new US intelligence assessment only lends strength to what many Western diplomats here already believe, and Iran consistently claims. There is no active Iranian military nuclear programme.

If not military, nor entirely peaceful, then why?

As one Iranian analyst once said to me, only half joking, if the Americans were not opposed to it, the Iranians would stop their nuclear programme tomorrow.

In other words, it is a power play.

By defying Washington, the Iranian regime is using the nuclear issue to strengthen its hand, just in the way North Korea did so successfully.

Conversely, there are those in Washington, probably including Vice President Dick Cheney, certainly including former UN ambassador John Bolton, who would like to use the nuclear issue to unseat the Iranian regime.

If that is the case, then whether Iran intends to produce a nuclear weapon is, in a strange sense, almost academic. It is the challenge to US power that is all important.


What does this mean for Israel?

Iran's main aim, according to this interpretation of events, is to secure the regime and strengthen its power in the world.

This is exactly the opposite of Israel's feared scenario, which is that Iran is building itself up for one last suicidal strike at the "Zionist entity".

And now for something completely different....

Source: BBC News

Shuffle the Deck and Pick a Card

Asia Times wrote an article on the recent NIE report and its role in Euro-US-Tehran relations. Here are some of the key parts:

But, too bad for Europe, the net result of the NIE is that, in effect, it makes Europe redundant in the nuclear diplomacy, by depriving it of the stick of US hard power that has constantly lurked in the background every time European officials met with the Iranians and pressed their (unreasonable) nuclear demands. These were that Iran should forever forego its right to peaceful nuclear technology simply because of unfounded allegations and hyped-up fears.

This is, indeed, the nub of the paradox of the new situation as a result of the NIE: it has raised Iran's expectations for a more proactive European role precisely when Europe is now deprived of the necessary muscle to deal with Iran, hitherto provided by the US's credible threat of military action. With the latter jettisoned from the equation for now, Europe's cards for dealing with Iran have diminished considerably. All the attention has been deflected from Vienna and other European capitals to Washington, which until now has "outsourced" its Iran nuclear diplomacy to Europe.

He goes on to write:

Another pertinent question deals with the US's own intentions behind the NIE, which apparently has been in the making more than a year. Is side-stepping Europe and the "embracing the dragon" approach one of the hidden intentions of this report? This would nail the US's hegemonic, leadership role, feebly questioned even by the pro-American Sarkozy, who wants to have his cake and eat it by putting Paris ahead of London as the US's most reliable European ally while, at the same time, charting an independent French Middle East policy.

Now, with the effective Americanization of Iran's nuclear dossier due to the inescapable implications of the NIE report, the US must decide how to shuffle the nuclear negotiation deck so that new trans-Atlantic fissures are not introduced that may threaten the well-spring of the Sarkozy- and Merkel-led pro-American drift of European politics.

Most likely, what will transpire is a European atrophy in which the formal EU role in the Iranian nuclear standoff increasingly becomes a shell of its past, with the US in total command, dictating even the mini-steps. Can it be avoided? Can Iran do anything to avoid it? A provisional answer, based on the trajectory of the present overall circumstances, is no.

Source: Asia Times

Assessing the NIE

George Perkovich at the Carnegie Endownment has released an assesment of the Dec 3 NIE report. Here are some of his findings:

[...]Many apparent ambiguities or contradictions in the NIE will be sorted in coming days and weeks. At this point the implications are more mixed than either disappointed hawks or relieved doves might think.

-This NIE takes the "nuclear weapons program" label off Iranian activities, but uranium enrichment and plutonium production pose potential threats no matter how they are labeled. The NIE does not say that there should be any confidence that Iran's nuclear program is solely for peaceful purposes, as required under the NPT. Indeed, it says "Iranian entities are continuing to develop a range of technical capabilities that could be applied to producing nuclear weapons, if a decision is made to do so." It’s just that the key capabilities—uranium enrichment and plutonium separation—are not properly deemed nuclear weapon threats if they are not accompanied by clear evidence of nuclear weaponization work.

-The NIE exposes that the rules regulating nuclear technology need to be updated, but the NIE will help Iran resist being the first case for new rules to be applied. Under the NPT, countries may produce nuclear fuel and develop other capabilities that could put them within months of manufacturing nuclear weapons. Iran continues to pursue uranium enrichment and a plutonium production capability, even though it does not yet have a single operating nuclear power plant and there are other sources of fuel available. The NIE understandably and properly accepts the distinctions within current nonproliferation rules: something is not a "nuclear weapons program" unless there is proof of work being done on nuclear weapon design and weaponization. The circumstantial case that Iran's enrichment program at least began with the intention of fueling a nuclear weapons option is inadmissible in making a one-sentence judgment about the Iranian nuclear program. The reversal of U.S. intelligence assessments from 2005 and 2007 is so dramatic that Iran will be able to dismiss any effort to impose limits on its nuclear activities that go beyond the narrow interpretation of existing rules.

-The NIE takes U.S. military attacks off the table. The Bush Administration, particularly Secretaries of State and Defense Rice and Gates, and Admirals Mullen and Fallon, had been trying for months to dissuade the world that the U.S. was hell bent to attack Iran, but could never convey the position unequivocally. As long as Russians, Chinese, and perhaps most importantly IAEA Director General ElBaradei believed the Bush Administration planned to attack Iran, they would not follow Washington in escalating pressure on Tehran, for fear that this would lead ultimately to war. Had President Bush negotiated with Moscow, Beijing, and ElBaradei to "trade" a commitment not to attack Iran for greater support for sanctions, chances of obtaining some Iranian constraints on its nuclear activities would have increased. The NIE removes that negotiating option. Critics of the Bush Administration might celebrate, but this would be shortsighted. Leverage is still needed to persuade Iran to take measures necessary to reassure its neighbors and the world that it is not gaming the inadequate nuclear rules in ways that could enable it to change its mind, break the rules, and very quickly build nuclear weapons.

-Unilateral, U.S. congressional sanctions, such as HR1400, that are predicated on Iran having a "nuclear weapons program" become even more problematic. These sanctions tie the hands of the executive branch, alienate allies necessary to isolate Iran, and otherwise weaken U.S. policy. The NIE now renders them absurd: according to the U.S. government, Iran does not have the "nuclear weapons program" that is the predicate for the sanctions, and therefore Iran could not cease the program in order to relieve businesses and others who might be sanctioned. The approach could be pared down to requiring Iran to eliminate or permanently suspend its uranium enrichment program. However, given the NIE it would be extremely difficult for the U.S. to impose economic sanctions and possibly jail terms on European or other business executives dealing with an Iran that refused to shut down enrichment activities that the U.S. intelligence community does not say are weapon-related.

-The U.S. and other members of the UN Security Council will be compelled to revisit the sanctions resolutions they already have adopted against Iran. Technically the case can be made that the sanctions are still valid because they stem from Iran’s inadequate cooperation with the IAEA in resolving the outstanding questions related to its past violations of safeguards requirements. The same can be said for the demand that Iran temporarily suspend its enrichment program. But politically, Russia, China, IAEA Director General ElBaradei and others who never wanted the issue referred to the UN Security Council, will now heed Tehran’s call to shift the Iran case to the IAEA and narrow it.

-The NIE will not lessen Iran’s Arab neighbors’ and Israel’s concerns over Iran’s nuclear capabilities and intentions, but it will make it harder to pressure Iran to change its behavior in ways that reassure the region.

In sum, Iranian leaders appear to have recognized that by staying within the rules they can acquire capabilities sufficient to impress their own people and intimidate their neighbors, without inviting tough international sanctions or military attack. The NIE, in a sense, says that Iran is playing the game so well that stopping it may not be possible within the rules. The question then arises: who can muster the international political will to change the rules?

Source: The Carnegie Endownment

Playing Catch-Up!

Sorry I haven't posted anything in a while. I've been busy battling Rhinoviruses and doing research. I will try to catch up in posting some new material.... (But don't hold me to it). In the mean time, enjoy this video of the Ukulele Orchestra of Great Britain playing 'The Good, the Bad, the Ugly'.

Retired Air Force Colonel Says Intel Operations Are Occuring in Iran

The Great Global Warming Swindle

Here is a program about Global Warming and the alarmists that aired, oddly enough, on the BBC. There are 9 parts:

Part 1

Part 2

Part 3

Part 4

Part 5

Part 6

Part 7

Part 8

Part 9

Former CIA Operative says US poised to strike Iran

Here is an article coming from Australian news services which has Bob Baer, a former CIA operative, stating that things are going to get hairy between the US and Iran.

What Poverty Problem?

The folks over at QandO found an interesting article on poverty. Here are some of the statistics from the article (source is the Census Bureau):

46 percent of all poor households actually own their own homes. The average home owned by persons classified as poor by the Census Bureau is a three-bedroom house with one-and-a-half baths, a garage, and a porch or patio.

80 percent of poor households have air conditioning. By contrast, in 1970, only 36 percent of the entire U.S. population enjoyed air conditioning.

Only six percent of poor households are overcrowded; two thirds have more than two rooms per person.

The typical poor American has more living space than the average individual living in Paris, London, Vienna, Athens, and other cities throughout Europe. (These comparisons are to the average citizens in foreign countries, not to those classified as poor.)

Nearly three quarters of poor households own a car; 31 percent own two or more cars.

97 percent of poor households have a color television; over half own two or more color televisions.

78 percent have a VCR or DVD player. 62 percent have cable or satellite TV reception.

89 percent own microwave ovens, more than half have a stereo, and a more than a third have an automatic dishwasher.

Source: http://www.qando.net/details.aspx?Entry=6771