Tuesday, December 25, 2007

The Turning of Tables

I am curious as to what brought about the turn of perspective.
Saudi Clergy Turn On Al Qaeda
December 20, 2007: Three years ago, Saudi cleric Salman al
Awdah, and 25 like-minded preachers, issued a religious ruling, that it was
justifiable for Iraqis to fight American "invaders." Al Awdah had also been a
supporter of Osama bin Laden and al Qaeda. But now al Awdah has changed his
tune, as have many of his supporters, and he has come out against Islamic
terrorism. This has ignited a controversy on pro-Islamic terror web sites,
because al Awdah has long been seen as a major supporter of bin Laden among the
senior Saudi clergy. While the Saudi government has been pressuring senior
clerics to at least stop encouraging Saudis to support al Qaeda, the switch to
being anti-al Qaeda appears to be a recognition that most Moslems have come to
view the slaughter of so many Iraqis by terrorists as beyond the pale. In that
respect, al Awdah is simply reflecting what most Moslems believe, and what he
can no longer defend.
blog it

Friday, December 21, 2007

How Big of a Sci-Fi Geek are You?

I'm a huge Geek...

Your Score : 85 creditsYou're an extreme sci-fi geek! You're probably wearing your very own homemade TRON costume right now!









Take the Sci fi sounds quiz I received 85 credits on
The Sci Fi Sounds Quiz

How much of a Sci-Fi geek are you?
Guess the Sci-Fi Movie Sounds hereCanon powershot

Wednesday, December 12, 2007

Winning the Oil Endgame

Amory Lovins, while at TED, talks about how to wean the US off of its oil dependency. He makes a very reasonable argument about how to do so while both helping the economy and maintaining national secuirty.

Download the book "Winning the Oil Endgame"

Source: TED

Tuesday, December 11, 2007

Enjoying the Arts

Found a website called FFFFOUND. Has an assortment of contemporary art and images. A number of pictures that caught my eye:

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Monday, December 10, 2007

CIA Agent Talks About Waterboarding

Former CIA Agent John Kiriakou talks about his use of waterboarding:
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John Kiriakou told US broadcaster ABC that "water-boarding" was used when his CIA team questioned suspected al-Qaeda chief recruiter Abu Zubaydah.

He said it might be torture but that it "broke" the detainee in seconds.

US authorities are investigating the CIA's destruction of tapes of al-Qaeda suspects being interrogated.

Mr Kiriakou told ABC the day after water-boarding was used on Abu Zubaydah, the detainee told his interrogator Allah had visited him in his cell during the night and told him to cooperate.

'Principles compromised'

"From that day on, he answered every question," the retired agent said.

"The threat information he provided disrupted a number of attacks, maybe dozens of attacks."
But he added:


"Like a lot of Americans, I'm involved in this internal, intellectual battle with myself weighing the idea that water-boarding may be torture versus the quality of information that we often get after using the water-boarding technique. And I struggle with it."

He said he felt water-boarding's use had "compromised [American] principles in the short term" and was unsure the technique would be justified any longer.

"At the time, I felt water-boarding was something we needed to do," he told ABC News.

"And as time has passed, and as September 11th has, you know, has moved farther and farther back into history, I think I've changed my mind."
--------------------

Source: BBC News

Bona Fide

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Ibn Khaldun Didn't Predict the Future...Did He?

One of the most brilliant thinkers of the Islamic world, and in all of history for that matter, is Ibn Khaldun. The man was an historian, philosopher, sociologist, and political theorist. One of his most famous works is the Muqaddimah (known as Prolegomenon in Latin). The selection below is one of the more well known pieces and talks about the natural ages of the state. This concept was a precursor to the idea of cyclical nature of history and society.
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....And the ages of the state, too, may differ according to astronomical conjunctures. Nevertheless, generally speaking, it is rare that the age of the state should exceed three generations, a generation being the average age of an individual, that is forty years or the time necessary for full growth and development....

We said that the age of the state rarely exceeds three generations because the first generation still retains its nomadic roughness and savagery, and such nomadic characteristics as a hard life, courage, predatoriness, and the desire to share glory. All this means that the strength of the solidarity uniting the people is still firm, which makes that people feared and powerful and able to dominate others.

The second generation, however, have already passed from the nomadic to the sedentary way of life, owing to the power they wield and the luxury they enjoy. They have abandoned their rough life for an easy and luxurious one. Instead of all sharing in the power and glory of the state, one wields it alone, the rest being too indolent to claim their part. Instead of aggressiveness and the desire for conquest we see in them contentment with what they have. All this relaxes the ties of solidarity, to a certain extent, and humility and submissiveness begin to appear in them; yet they still retain much of their pristine spirit because of what they have seen and remembered of the previous generation, with its self-confidence, pursuit of glory, and power to defend and protect itself. They cannot entirely give up all these characteristics, even though they have abandoned some of them.

They still hope to regain the conditions prevailing in the previous generation, or even have the illusion that these virtues are still to be found in them.

As for the third generation, they have completely forgotten the nomadic and rough stage, as though it had never existed. They have also lost their love of power and their social solidarity through having been accustomed to being ruled. Luxury corrupts them, because of the pleasant and easy way of living in which they have been brought up. As a result, they become a liability on the state, like women and children who need to be protected. Solidarity is completely relaxed and the arts of defending oneself and of attacking the enemy are forgotten.

They deceive people by their insignia, dress, horse-riding and culture; yet all the while they are more cowardly than women. If then a claimant or aggressor appear, they are incapable of pushing him back. Consequently, the head of the state is compelled to rely on others for defence, making extensive use of clients and mercenaries, who may to some extent replace the original free warriors....
--------------------
I think one can draw an analogy to the 'first generation' being the generation that survived the Great Depression and WWII ("The Greatest Generation"); the 'second generation' being those who grew up in the 60s and 70s ("Baby Boomers"); and finally the 'third generation' being those who grew up in the 80s and late 90s ("Generation x").

Many people have questioned whether today the citizens of the US are becoming too apathetic and allowing for their resolve to expire too easily. The US already relies heavily on private armys, such as Blackwater, to fight in Iraq. This seems as it is going as Ibn Khaldun had predicted. Lets hope he is wrong, for our sake.

Source: http://www.muslimphilosophy.com/ik/Muqaddimah/Chapter3/Ch_3_12.htm

Muslim Population in Europe

This is a rough draft to a small research paper I did sometime ago on the Muslim population in Europe. Although it is somewhat old, I think it still is very apropos.

Today, there are around 15 million Muslims in the continent of Europe (Douthat 1). The Muslim population is the largest minority group within Western Europe. Immigrating from not only Africa and South West Asia, but also coming from the Balkans and Central Asia. With the rise of bombings and riots in Western Europe recently, the European conscienceness has been focused on this large Muslim minority.

To fully understand the Islamic tensions within Western Europe, one must examine the Muslim groups in its historical and current context. The Muslim population first appeared as a noticeable group in Europe post-World War II. Western Europe, in order to accelerate the rebuilding process, permitted groups of Muslims from around the world to come into the different European states and work. Much of the Muslims hailed from a former or what was a current colony of a European state. In other words, much of Britain’s Muslims came from Pakistan while much of France’s came from North Africa (most notably Morocco and Algeria). To the European countries, this situation was permissible believing the Muslims workforce would only be temporary. But soon the Muslim groups began to settle in. For various reasons, the rich Middle-Eastern states began investing its oil money in the Muslim infrastructure, financing mosques and other Muslim organizations, making the Muslim population more integrated within Western Europe (Grillo 863). This led to the 1980s, where Muslims slowly started to push Islam into the public sphere. The push was, and still is, resisted by the Western Europe, seeing it as an expansion of ‘fundamentalism.’ But mostly, these issues include: the effective integration of Muslims into European society, participation in local and national government, equal representation in education, separate schools and cultural institutions, separate burial sites in cemeteries (Karic 440).

Examining the Muslim group as a whole is very problematic. Islam, like Christianity, is very diverse religion giving way to alternate views. Someone who claims to be ‘Muslim’ might be contested by other Muslims. But even with this problem, there seems to be a ‘Transnational Islam,’ or a larger Muslim community. “Transnationalism refers to social, cultural, economic and political relations which are between, above and beyond the nation-state, interconnecting, transcending, perhaps even superseding, what has been for the past two hundred years their primary locus” (Grillo 864). This concept connects Muslim migrants who live across borders with something higher than a seen government or a society.

There are three different ways which Islam may be defined as transnational. The first is Islam within transnational circuits. Meaning those who are involved are circulatory migrants with families in Asia or somewhere else rather than Europe. These people, mostly all men, live and work temporarily in Europe on a long term basis, eventually returning to their country of origin which they maintain social, economic, and religious ties. The second is Islam within a bi-national/plurinational framework. Meaning those who work “abroad and are bound-legally, economically, politically-by the circumstance of two nation-states: where they reside, and whence they came” (Grillo 865).

The third and most important concept of transnational Islam is the idea of the umma. The umma is “the imagined community of Muslims at large either within one society or across many,” making it “a global socioreligious fraternity without a normative structure” (Grillo, 866; Malik, 2). Even the non-Muslims have inherited the concept of the umma. In the past, Muslims were often identified by their ethnicity, where as now, Muslims are classified as ‘Muslim’ (Malik, 70). The umma is especially important for Muslims in Europe who have little else to relate to. Since the umma is based solely around being ‘Muslim,’ it allows relationships outside ethnicities. In fact, European Muslims rather marry a Muslim not of their ethnicity, than to marry a non-Muslim of their own ethnicity (Malik, 3). Not only is the umma a source of identification for new migrants and old people, but also for second and third generation youths who are trying “to find their place between the culture of their parents and the indifference, rejection and sometimes outright racism of their country of birth” (Statham 3).

Within the umma, many Muslims are slowly moving to uniting Islamic ideals and European values forming what has been called ‘Euro-Islam’ (Karic 437). In Islam, some critics argue, lies the notion of compromise or negotiation called dar-al-sulh. With the dar-al-sulh, Muslims can use ijtihad or “independent judgment,” which involves two conditions: one, he must devote time and energy to study the Quran; and two, he has to be familiar with the customary law of the land and “exigencies of human life” (Malik, 8). But the Islamic fundamentalists believe the Shari’ah, Islamic law, always overrides the concepts of dar-al-sulh and ijtihad. Overall, most European Muslims are “reconciled to the idea of working and operating within the system” (Grillo, 837). In fact, some “Turkish Muslims often report finding it easier to live as a Muslim in Germany […] than in Turkey” (Grillo, 875).

The concepts of ‘Assimilation’ and ‘Integration’ for the Muslim and non-Muslim population raises many issues. Assimilation involves the cultural and structural merger of ethnic or religious categories, while integration involves cultural but not structural blending (Malik, 4). Assimilation into Western European societies has never appealed to Muslims. Most Western societies today do not demand assimilation, while the umma helps resist any pressure that does remain. What is ironic is the fact that most European Muslims resist the idea of assimilation, but have a very faint concept to “many cultural norms and values of the Muslim world” (Malik, 7). With integration, Muslims are allowed to acquire full political rights while retaining some cultural, ethnic, and/or religious identification.

But even today, much of Western Europe is having a difficult time integrating the Muslim population. There having been strives to allow some rights to Muslims, but “the presence of Muslims has often been depicted by politicians and commentators as a challenge to the norms, values, and principles of liberal democracy” (Statham 1). In fact several radical right populist parties, such as the Front National in France, the Lijst Pirn Fortuyn in the Netherlands, the Vlaams Blok in Belgium, and the Det Konservative Folkpartei inn Demark, have made Muslim immigration an electoral issue (Statham 2). Even though European societies see themselves as secular, the Christian religion plays an important institutional social and political role (Statham 3).

Each Western European state has taken a different stance with the issue of the Muslims with in their boundaries. Before 2000, migrants had no political rights in Germany; and Muslims today, have little access in the political process, except for the local foreigners’ councils which is considered powerless. Germany remains relativity against any open to public expressions of Islam.

France on the other hand, is one of the few countries who is trying to have the Muslims assimilate into “Frenchmen.” Muslims must “renounce all particular identities in favor of allegiance to secular values of the French republic” (Statham 4). France values its stance of being aggressively secular, seeing public displays of faith a challenge to French ideology. In fact, President Jacques Chirac passed a bill in 2004, banning Muslim headscarves and other religious symbols from schools (Statham 4).

The British and the Dutch have been relatively opposite from their German neighbors when it comes to Muslim polices. Migrants are allowed to publicly express certain aspects of their identities, and are sponsored to do so by core institutions, including local authorities, schools, the military, and the media (Statham 4). Britain has anti-discrimination laws but they are based on ethnic minorities not religious ones. Lately, Britain has decided to start funding Islamic faith-based schools, which before was only allotted for the Judeo-Christian schools. The Dutch has allowed a great deal of autonomy for their Muslim minorities. For example, the Dutch government has an Islamic broadcasting network, Islamic school board, and Islamic schools.

Cultural isolation experienced by European Muslims is a problem facing every European state. The Muslims, keeping themselves segregated, try to stay away from the decadence of Western society and its temptations (Grillo 870). Seven in ten French people, two in three Germans, and nearly as many of the British and Dutch believe a sense of separation is growing among Muslims in their country (Stokes 2). The Economist reports:

“Muslims tend to come from poor, rural areas; most are ill-educated, many are brown. They often encounter xenophobia and discrimination, sometimes made worse by racist politicians. They speak the language of the wider society either poorly or not at all, so they find it hard to get jobs. Their children struggle at school. They huddle in poor districts, often in state-supplied housing. For all these reasons they tend to withdraw into their own world, which is relatively easy, since their numbers are great enough to enable them to form a fairly self-contained community”

This isolation, especially in the ghettos, leads to a group of angry Muslim youth, who find the country they live in responsible for their problems. The youth see Islamic extremism, nurtured by radical clerics, as the answer to their problems.

According to Walter Laqueur, Western Europe has become the main base of terrorist support groups or “jihadist” (Leiken, 1). The tedious process has been facilitated by growth of tensions within Muslim communities and the relative freedoms with which radicals could organize (55). A “feeling of deep resentment” grew within the second-generation of immigrants because they felt they could not compete with the rest of the country. With these mind-set and feelings of being excluded, the young Muslims began to take out their aggression against the authorities and its supporters, often called inscurit by the French (a code word for the combination of vandalism, delinquency, and hate crimes stemming from Muslim immigrant enclaves) (Leiken 2). This only led the government and non-Muslims to isolate and restrict the Muslims more, adding to the cycle of violence.

The jihadist networks span all across Europe, but mostly in Western Europe where freedom allows for free association and movement. According to Leiken, there are two types of jihadist in Western Europe: “outsiders” and “insiders”. The outsiders are typically asylum seekers or students, among them are radical imams. The insiders are the alienated citizens, and the second generation children of immigrant Muslims. Within these two groups there are two social classes: the educated who are the leaders, and the ghetto dwellers who provide the muscle to the movement (4). These extreme groups are not just limited to traveling freely around Europe, but they also can visa-free travel to the United States.

Examples of large attacks against Western Europe include the July 7 bombings of London, the Madrid bombings, and the assassination of van Gogh. Theo van Gogh, a film-maker, who made an anti-radical Islamic film, was assassinated by a Muslim Dutch extremist. The act was a shock to Europe, especially to the Netherlands, which made them toughen certain social policies related to the Muslim population. The London bombings of July 7 were carried out by four British citizens who were connected to Al Qaeda (Powell 2). After this attack, in a backlash against the Muslim community, support for Prime Minister Tony Blair and his Iraq policy greatly increased (Baker 1). Ironically, much of the Muslim animosity for the West comes from the conflict in Iraq, thus perpetuating the circle of violence. The British government, in reaction to the bombings, enacted legislation that would be able to expel preachers who expel hate speech (Yew 1).

The feeling of outrage by the non-Muslim British community can be seen in this excerpt of the British newspaper, The Weekly Standard:
“By far the biggest challenge the government will now face in this new phase of the war on terror will be to redress the damage done by years of a policy of politically correct multiculturalism that has allowed alternative subcultures to grow like tumors in British society” (Baker 3).

Works Cited
Baker, Gerard. “The London Effect” The Weekly Standard. Jul 25, 2005. Vol 10, Iss 42. pg 9

Douhat, Ross. “A Muslim Europe?” The Atlantic Monthly. Jan/Feb 2005. Vol 295, Iss 1. pg 58

Fetzer, Joel S. Muslims and the State in Britain, France, and Germany. 2005. Cambridge Press: New York

Grillo, Ralph. “Islam and Transnationalism” Journal of Ethnic and Migration Studies. Sept 2004. Vol 30, No 5. pg 861-878

Karic, Enes. “Is ‘Euro-Islam’ a Myth, Challenge or a Real Opportunity for Muslims and Europe?” Journal of Muslim Minority Affairs. 2002. Vol 22, No 2. pg 435

Laqueur, Walter. “The Terrorism to Come” Policy Review. Aug/Sept 2004. pg 49-64

Leiken, Robert S. “Europe’s Angry Muslims” Foreign Affairs. Jul/Aug 2005. Vol 84, Iss 4. pg 120

Malik, Mustafa. “Muslims Pluralize the West, Resist Assimilation” Middle East Policy. Spring 2004. Vol 11, Iss 1. pg 70

Pauly, Robert J. Islam in Europe: Integration or Marginalization? 2004. Ashgate: England

Powell, Bill. “Generation Jihad” Time. Oct 3, 2005. Vol 166, Iss 14. pg 56

Statham, Paul. “Resilient Islam” Harvard International Review. Fall 2004. Vol 26, Iss 3. pg 54

Stokes, Bruce. “Easing Muslim Alienation in Europe” National Journal. Jul 16, 2005. Vol 37, Iss 29. pg 2304

The Economist. “Europe: After Ven Gogh; Islamic terrorism in Europe” Nov 13, 2004. Vol 373, Iss 8401. pg 44

The Economist. “Leaders: Europe’s Muslims” Aug 10, 2002. Vol 364, Iss 8285. pg 10Yew, Lee Kuan. “Homegrown Islamic Terrorsists” Forbes. Oct. 17, 2005. Vol. 176, Iss 8. pg 37

Sunday, December 9, 2007

Playing Games with Iran

I came across this when doing some research in game theory. Andreas Blume at the University of Pittsburgh gives an example, through game theory, of what courses of action the US could take with respect to Iran.
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Iran and the West
Iran seeks to go forward with work on uranium enrichment.
The US and Europe are worried that having a uranium enrichment facility will eventually enable Iran to build a nuclear bomb.
A coarse description of their respective strategic options might be as follows:
1. The West can ignore the problem, engage in diplomacy, or act militarily.
2. Iran can give up their nuclear ambition, slowly develop its enrichment capabilities, or opt for rapid development.

Some thoughts about payoffs for the West-Iran Game:

1.We will choose to model the conflict as a zero-sum game. A note of caution: This deliberately ignores that there are numerous dimensions of common interest between Iran and the West.
2. It suffices to keep track of the payoff of only one of players (we’ll choose the West); the other player’s payoffs are the same, except with the opposite sign.
3. If Iran decides to give up its nuclear ambition, then ignoring what they do is a valid option for the West, which will be indicated by a positive payoff, 5, for the West. Recall that Iran’s payoff in this case must be −5.
4. Ignoring Iran’s ambitions is less attractive if Iran chooses slow, indicated by a negative payoff, -2, for the West.
5. The worst outcome for the West is to ignore the problem when Iran proceeds rapidly, indicated by a payoff of -6.
6. The best outcome for the West with diplomacy would be if Iran gave up its ambition. The worst outcome in this case would be if Iran kept slowly developing its enrichment capabilities. In the case that Iran proceeded
rapidly, it would then be possible to convince others, e.g. Russia and China, that diplomacy has been exhausted.

7. Military action, in the game we will set up, is the preferred option only in the event that Iran proceeds rapidly.

Payoff Matrix for West-Iran Game
Iran
Give Up __Slow __Rapid
_____________________________Ignore______ 5__ _-2____-6
__________________West __ Diplomacy _____4 ____-1 ____1
_______________________________Act _____-5 ____-4 ____2
Game III-2

Consider the West’s decision problem first:
Unlike before, assume that the West is afraid that Iran will always discover its strategy choice and that, knowing the West’s strategy, Iran will always try to hold the West’s payoff as low as possible.
One may ask: What is the best strategy against an omniscient opponent who is trying to minimize one’s payoff?
1. Against an omniscient adversary with diametrically opposed interests, the West’s payoff from ignore is -6.
2. Against an omniscient adversary with diametrically opposed interests, the West’s payoff from diplomacy is -1.
3. Against an omniscient adversary with diametrically opposed interests, the West’s payoff from act is -5.
4. In this scenario there is an unambiguously best strategy for the West: Diplomacy.

Observe that the payoff of −1 is the highest payoff that the West can guarantee for itself in this game.
The West secures at least the payoff -1 by adopting the strategy diplomacy.
Assume that Iran is equally afraid that the West will have advance knowledge of Iran’s strategy and will limit Iran’s payoff as much as possible.
We can think of Iran as trying to minimize the West’s payoff. Thus, in our payoff matrix, Iran aims for low values.
One may ask: What is the best strategy for Iran against an omniscient West who is trying to limit Iran’s payoff as much as possible?

In this world, Iran will try to minimize the maximum payoff that the West can achieve against any of Iran’s strategies.
-The West’s highest payoff against Iran’s strategy give up is 5.
-The West’s highest payoff against Iran’s strategy slow is -1.
-The West’s highest payoff against Iran’s strategy rapid is 2.

Recall our assumption that Iran’s goal is to minimize the maximum payoff the West can achieve against Iran’s strategy.
This goal is achieved by adopting the strategy slow.
Iran’s strategy slow guarantees that the West can achieve no higher payoff than -1.

Observe that both the West and Iran can guarantee the payoff -1 in this game.
The West can guarantee that its payoff will be at least -1.
Iran can guarantee that the West’s payoff is no higher than -1.
--------------------
It appears as though Diplomacy is the best course of action.

Iranian Media

Here is an 9 min compilation of Iranian media clips pulled together by MEMRI.

Saturday, December 8, 2007

We Are the Knights Who Say NIE!

Sorry, I couldn't resist. I'd thought some Monty Python would lighten the mood. Speaking of the British, here is some more analysis of the NIE report, this time coming from the BBC:

Indeed, the new US intelligence assessment only lends strength to what many Western diplomats here already believe, and Iran consistently claims. There is no active Iranian military nuclear programme.

If not military, nor entirely peaceful, then why?

As one Iranian analyst once said to me, only half joking, if the Americans were not opposed to it, the Iranians would stop their nuclear programme tomorrow.

In other words, it is a power play.

By defying Washington, the Iranian regime is using the nuclear issue to strengthen its hand, just in the way North Korea did so successfully.

Conversely, there are those in Washington, probably including Vice President Dick Cheney, certainly including former UN ambassador John Bolton, who would like to use the nuclear issue to unseat the Iranian regime.

If that is the case, then whether Iran intends to produce a nuclear weapon is, in a strange sense, almost academic. It is the challenge to US power that is all important.


What does this mean for Israel?

Iran's main aim, according to this interpretation of events, is to secure the regime and strengthen its power in the world.

This is exactly the opposite of Israel's feared scenario, which is that Iran is building itself up for one last suicidal strike at the "Zionist entity".

And now for something completely different....
Source: BBC News

Friday, December 7, 2007

Shuffle the Deck and Pick a Card

Asia Times wrote an article on the recent NIE report and its role in Euro-US-Tehran relations. Here are some of the key parts:

But, too bad for Europe, the net result of the NIE is that, in effect, it makes Europe redundant in the nuclear diplomacy, by depriving it of the stick of US hard power that has constantly lurked in the background every time European officials met with the Iranians and pressed their (unreasonable) nuclear demands. These were that Iran should forever forego its right to peaceful nuclear technology simply because of unfounded allegations and hyped-up fears.

This is, indeed, the nub of the paradox of the new situation as a result of the NIE: it has raised Iran's expectations for a more proactive European role precisely when Europe is now deprived of the necessary muscle to deal with Iran, hitherto provided by the US's credible threat of military action. With the latter jettisoned from the equation for now, Europe's cards for dealing with Iran have diminished considerably. All the attention has been deflected from Vienna and other European capitals to Washington, which until now has "outsourced" its Iran nuclear diplomacy to Europe.

He goes on to write:

Another pertinent question deals with the US's own intentions behind the NIE, which apparently has been in the making more than a year. Is side-stepping Europe and the "embracing the dragon" approach one of the hidden intentions of this report? This would nail the US's hegemonic, leadership role, feebly questioned even by the pro-American Sarkozy, who wants to have his cake and eat it by putting Paris ahead of London as the US's most reliable European ally while, at the same time, charting an independent French Middle East policy.

Now, with the effective Americanization of Iran's nuclear dossier due to the inescapable implications of the NIE report, the US must decide how to shuffle the nuclear negotiation deck so that new trans-Atlantic fissures are not introduced that may threaten the well-spring of the Sarkozy- and Merkel-led pro-American drift of European politics.

Most likely, what will transpire is a European atrophy in which the formal EU role in the Iranian nuclear standoff increasingly becomes a shell of its past, with the US in total command, dictating even the mini-steps. Can it be avoided? Can Iran do anything to avoid it? A provisional answer, based on the trajectory of the present overall circumstances, is no.

Source: Asia Times

Assessing the NIE

George Perkovich at the Carnegie Endownment has released an assesment of the Dec 3 NIE report. Here are some of his findings:

[...]Many apparent ambiguities or contradictions in the NIE will be sorted in coming days and weeks. At this point the implications are more mixed than either disappointed hawks or relieved doves might think.

-This NIE takes the "nuclear weapons program" label off Iranian activities, but uranium enrichment and plutonium production pose potential threats no matter how they are labeled. The NIE does not say that there should be any confidence that Iran's nuclear program is solely for peaceful purposes, as required under the NPT. Indeed, it says "Iranian entities are continuing to develop a range of technical capabilities that could be applied to producing nuclear weapons, if a decision is made to do so." It’s just that the key capabilities—uranium enrichment and plutonium separation—are not properly deemed nuclear weapon threats if they are not accompanied by clear evidence of nuclear weaponization work.

-The NIE exposes that the rules regulating nuclear technology need to be updated, but the NIE will help Iran resist being the first case for new rules to be applied. Under the NPT, countries may produce nuclear fuel and develop other capabilities that could put them within months of manufacturing nuclear weapons. Iran continues to pursue uranium enrichment and a plutonium production capability, even though it does not yet have a single operating nuclear power plant and there are other sources of fuel available. The NIE understandably and properly accepts the distinctions within current nonproliferation rules: something is not a "nuclear weapons program" unless there is proof of work being done on nuclear weapon design and weaponization. The circumstantial case that Iran's enrichment program at least began with the intention of fueling a nuclear weapons option is inadmissible in making a one-sentence judgment about the Iranian nuclear program. The reversal of U.S. intelligence assessments from 2005 and 2007 is so dramatic that Iran will be able to dismiss any effort to impose limits on its nuclear activities that go beyond the narrow interpretation of existing rules.

-The NIE takes U.S. military attacks off the table. The Bush Administration, particularly Secretaries of State and Defense Rice and Gates, and Admirals Mullen and Fallon, had been trying for months to dissuade the world that the U.S. was hell bent to attack Iran, but could never convey the position unequivocally. As long as Russians, Chinese, and perhaps most importantly IAEA Director General ElBaradei believed the Bush Administration planned to attack Iran, they would not follow Washington in escalating pressure on Tehran, for fear that this would lead ultimately to war. Had President Bush negotiated with Moscow, Beijing, and ElBaradei to "trade" a commitment not to attack Iran for greater support for sanctions, chances of obtaining some Iranian constraints on its nuclear activities would have increased. The NIE removes that negotiating option. Critics of the Bush Administration might celebrate, but this would be shortsighted. Leverage is still needed to persuade Iran to take measures necessary to reassure its neighbors and the world that it is not gaming the inadequate nuclear rules in ways that could enable it to change its mind, break the rules, and very quickly build nuclear weapons.

-Unilateral, U.S. congressional sanctions, such as HR1400, that are predicated on Iran having a "nuclear weapons program" become even more problematic. These sanctions tie the hands of the executive branch, alienate allies necessary to isolate Iran, and otherwise weaken U.S. policy. The NIE now renders them absurd: according to the U.S. government, Iran does not have the "nuclear weapons program" that is the predicate for the sanctions, and therefore Iran could not cease the program in order to relieve businesses and others who might be sanctioned. The approach could be pared down to requiring Iran to eliminate or permanently suspend its uranium enrichment program. However, given the NIE it would be extremely difficult for the U.S. to impose economic sanctions and possibly jail terms on European or other business executives dealing with an Iran that refused to shut down enrichment activities that the U.S. intelligence community does not say are weapon-related.

-The U.S. and other members of the UN Security Council will be compelled to revisit the sanctions resolutions they already have adopted against Iran. Technically the case can be made that the sanctions are still valid because they stem from Iran’s inadequate cooperation with the IAEA in resolving the outstanding questions related to its past violations of safeguards requirements. The same can be said for the demand that Iran temporarily suspend its enrichment program. But politically, Russia, China, IAEA Director General ElBaradei and others who never wanted the issue referred to the UN Security Council, will now heed Tehran’s call to shift the Iran case to the IAEA and narrow it.

-The NIE will not lessen Iran’s Arab neighbors’ and Israel’s concerns over Iran’s nuclear capabilities and intentions, but it will make it harder to pressure Iran to change its behavior in ways that reassure the region.

In sum, Iranian leaders appear to have recognized that by staying within the rules they can acquire capabilities sufficient to impress their own people and intimidate their neighbors, without inviting tough international sanctions or military attack. The NIE, in a sense, says that Iran is playing the game so well that stopping it may not be possible within the rules. The question then arises: who can muster the international political will to change the rules?

Source: The Carnegie Endownment